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1 Motivation and Introduction
During the past half century, economists have made considerable progress in understanding the
theoretical structure of equilibrium strategic behavior under market mechanisms, such as auctions;
see Krishna [2010] for a comprehensive presentation and evaluation of progress.
One analytic device used to describe bidder motivation at single-object auctions is a continuous
random variable that represents a bidder-specific signal concerning the object’s true, but ex ante
unknown, value. This true, but ex ante unknown, value will only be revealed after the auction has
ended, when the winner has been determined and the transaction price paid. Regardless of the
winner, however, the value of the object is the same to all.
The conceptual experiment involves each potential bidder’s receiving a draw from a signal
distribution. Conditional on his draw, a bidder is then assumed to act purposefully, using the
information in his signal along with Bayes’ rule to maximize either the expected profit or the
expected utility of profit from winning the auction. Another frequently-made assumption is that
the signal draws of bidders are independent and that the bidders are ex ante symmetric—their
draws coming from the same distribution of signals. This framework is often referred to as the
symmetric common-value paradigm (symmetric CVP).
Under these assumptions, a researcher can then focus on a representative agent’s decision rule
when characterizing equilibrium behavior. Wilson [1977] invented this framework to illustrate that,
in equilibrium, the winner’s curse could not obtain among rational bidders. He also demonstrated
that when the number of bidders n gets large (tends to infinity) the winning bid at first-price, sealed-
bid auctions converges almost surely to the true value of the object. In other words, the auction
format and pricing rule play an important role in aggregating the disparate, individual pieces of
information held by the bidders. Milgrom [1979] subsequently provided a precise characterization
of the structure the signal distribution must possess in order for this convergence property to hold;
Pesendorfer and Swinkels [1997] have referred to this as full information aggregation.
When several, say k, units of a good are simultaneously for sale, Weber [1983] has described
a number of different multi-unit auction formats as well as pricing rules under those formats. At
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least two important questions arise: specifically, who will the winning bidders be and what price(s)
will those winners pay? For example, Milgrom [1981] developed a natural generalization of the
Wilson [1977] model. In Milgrom’s model, each bidder submits a sealed bid and the auctioneer
then aggregates these demands, allocating the units to those bidders with the highest k submitted
bids. The winners then pay a uniform price—specifically, the highest rejected bid.
Pesendorfer and Swinkels [1997] have built on this research by investigating a sequence of
auctions {Ar} in which both nr and kr increase. They demonstrated that a necessary and sufficient
condition for full information aggregation is that kr → ∞ and (nr − kr) → ∞, a condition they
referred to as double largeness. Under the double-largeness condition, non-negligible supply can
be a substitute for the strong signal structure required in Wilson [1977], Milgrom [1979, 1981],
and Kremer [2002].
While it is heartening to know that conditions exist under which transaction prices will con-
verge in probability to the true, but ex ante unknown, values of objects for sale, the rates at which
these prices converge are also of interest. In particular, Hong and Shum [2004] asked the question
“How large must n be to be large enough?” and then investigated the rates of information aggre-
gation in common-value environments. Knowing the conditions under which the transaction price
provides a potentially useful estimate of the object’s unknown value is important to understanding
the process some refer to as price discovery because neither the number of bidders nor the number
of units for sale ever really gets to infinity in practice.
Of course, the pricing rule investigated in Wilson [1977] and Milgrom [1979, 1981] as well as
Pesendorfer and Swinkels [1997, 2000] is not the only one that could be used under a sealed-bid
auction format. For example, another pricing rule would involve allocating the k units to those bid-
ders who tendered the highest k bids, but then having each winner pay what he bid for the unit(s) he
won. In general, at multi-unit auctions, different auction formats and different pricing rules induce
different equilibrium behavior and can, thus, translate into different transaction prices as well as po-
tentially different expected revenues for sellers. Hence, as Jackson and Kremer [2004, 2006] have
emphasized, understanding the effects of auction formats and pricing rules has important practical
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relevance. Even small changes can have effects, as has been illustrated by Mezzetti and Tsetlin
[2008, 2009].
In a companion paper to Milgrom and Weber [1982], which was published nearly two decades
later, Milgrom and Weber [2000] proposed a pricing rule for multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auc-
tions. The model studied by Milgrom and Weber [2000] is the multi-unit variant of the clock
model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982] in order to investigate behavior at single-object,
oral, ascending-price (often referred to as English) auctions. In the multi-unit model, bidders are
assumed to demand at most one unit of the good for sale; Milgrom [2004] has referred to this as
singleton demand. The current price for all units on sale rises continuously according to some
device, such as a clock. As the price rises, the drop-out prices of losing participants are recorded
when they exit the auction. The transaction price is the drop-out price of the last participant to exit
the auction. Each of the remaining k participants is then allocated one unit at the transaction price.
One attractive feature of oral, ascending-price auctions vis-a`-vis sealed-bid ones is the scope
for information release at oral, ascending-price auctions. This is particularly important in informa-
tional environments with substantial common-value components. In common-value environments,
by observing the actions of his competitors, a bidder can augment the information contained in his
signal and, thus, may be able to reduce the uncertainty concerning the unknown value of the object
for sale. Other things being equal, this reduction in uncertainty can induce participants to bid more
aggressively than under sealed-bid formats, which means the revenues the seller can expect to gar-
ner can increase. The greater is the linkage between a bidder’s information and what he perceives
others will bid, the higher the bidding. Milgrom and Weber [1982] have referred to this as the link-
age principle. In models of single-object auctions, Milgrom and Weber used the linkage principle
to rank the revenues a seller can expect to garner under the different auction formats and pricing
rules, for the same marginal distribution. In short, Milgrom and Weber [1982] demonstrated that,
on average, the English auction format yields more revenue than first-price auctions, such as the
oral, descending-price (Dutch) format or the first-price, sealed-bid format.
For multi-unit auctions within the CVP, as the numbers of bidders and units get large in the
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Pesendorfer–Swinkels sense, we compare the behavior of transaction prices under two different
combinations of auction format and pricing rule, those of Milgrom and Weber as well as Pesendor-
fer and Swinkels. We demonstrate that the asymptotic distributions of the transaction prices are
Gaussian, but that the asymptotic variance of the transaction price under the Milgrom–Weber auc-
tion is less than that under the Pesendorfer–Swinkels auction. If the transaction prices under dif-
ferent auction formats and pricing rules are viewed as statistical estimators of the true, but ex ante
unknown, value of the units for sale, then the Milgrom–Weber auction provides a more efficient
estimator of the unknown value than the Pesendorfer–Swinkels auction because more information
is released with ascending bids than with sealed bids. Note, however, that when the number of bid-
ders is large, the differences in both the expected transaction prices and their asymptotic variances
are small because the transaction prices converge to the same value.
From the structure of the proof in Milgrom and Weber [1982], one can deduce that the same
linkage principle applies to the multi-unit auction we study in this paper. In theory, the link-
age principle implies that the additional information aggregated in the price of the ascending-bid
auction relative to the sealed-bid auction translates into higher expected revenues for the seller
at the ascending-bid auction. Such differences in information decrease as the number of bidders
increases. Whether the revenue differences induced by the information structures across auction
formats and pricing rules are economically important remains an empirical issue. By estimating
the variation of the signal distribution from data, one can investigate empirically the difference in
the seller’s expected revenues across the multi-unit auction formats and pricing rules. To the best
of our knowledge, this research represents the first attempt to quantify the value of information in
multi-unit auctions.
For the data used below, we have found that the loss in expected revenues resulting from a
switch to the sealed-bid format from the oral, ascending-price format is small, relative to both
the transaction price and the estimated common value. Our results suggest that, on average, the
Pesendorfer–Swinkels auction generates nearly as much revenue for the seller as the Milgrom–
Weber auction does. In this particular application, the auctioneer could have done just as well by
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selling the objects using the Pesendorfer–Swinkels auction.
We should also mention that a continuum of equilibria can exist in models of English auctions.
For example, Bikhchandani et al. [2002] have characterized the symmetric, separating equilibria of
a single-object English auction model. Multiple equilibria may also arise in the Milgrom–Weber
model we have employed. Fortunately, the information aggregation result remains unchanged
because the transaction price is determined in the final round of bidding, where the bid functions
are the same across equilibria. While the bid functions in previous rounds can be different in
different equilibria, provided bidders know this and use this information to invert the signals, the
true signals can still be recovered, which is what matters for the information set in the final round of
the auction. As noted by Bikhchandani et al. [2002], the multiplicity of equilibria affects how bids
from the previous rounds of bidding are interpreted in an econometric procedure. Our empirical
analysis relies on the equilibrium of the Milgrom–Weber model. Although the transaction price
remains a consistent estimator of the true value, estimating the dispersion of the signal distribution
is difficult in the presence of multiple equilibria.
Our paper is in six additional sections as well as an appendix. In the next, we use the Milgrom–
Weber clock model to develop a theoretical framework within which to investigate the stochastic
behavior of the transaction price at a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auction within the common-
value paradigm, while in section 3 we demonstrate that, as the number of bidders n and the number
of units k get large in the Pesendorfer–Swinkels sense, the transaction price converges in probabil-
ity to the true, but ex ante unknown, value. We characterize in section 4 the asymptotic distribution
of the transaction price when both the number of bidders and the number of units get large, and
compare the asymptotic variances of transactions prices under both the Milgrom–Weber and the
Pesendorfer–Swinkels auctions. In section 5, we derive the likelihood function of observed drop-
out prices, while in section 6, we apply our methods to data from an auction of taxi license plates
held in Shenzhen, China. In the final section, we summarize and conclude. Any details too cum-
bersome to be included in the text of the paper have been collected in the appendix at the end of
the paper.
6
2 Theoretical Model
Consider an oral, ascending-price auction at which k identical units of an object are for sale to
a total of n bidders, each of whom wants at most one unit. Assume that k is strictly less than
n. Focus on the Milgrom and Weber [2000] pricing rule described in the introduction. Assume
that, conditional on the true (but unknown) value v0, each bidder draws an independently- and
identically-distributed signal X. Denote the cumulative distribution and probability density func-
tions of X, conditional on v, by FX|V(x|v) and fX|V(x|v), respectively, and assume fX|V(x|v) satisfies
the monotone likelihood ratio condition in Milgrom [1981]. Denote the prior distribution of the
unknown value V by fV(v)
Consider the vector of signals (X1, X2, . . . , Xn), a random sample of n draws from FX|V(x|v0).
Because this environment is symmetric, without loss of generality, we focus below on bidder 1.
Denote by Yi the ith ordered signal of the opponents of bidder 1, so
Y1 ≥ Y2 ≥ · · · ≥ Yn−1.
Denote by Zi the ith order statistic for all of the Xis, so
Z1 ≥ Z2 ≥ · · · ≥ Zn.
The auction proceeds in rounds m = n, n − 1, . . . , k + 1. In round m, m bidders continue to
participate in the auction. The auction ends in round (k + 1) when the (k + 1)st bidder exits the
auction. Without loss of generality, suppose that bidders are ordered in the reverse order of exit
from the auction.
Let Ωm denote the information that has already been revealed in round m by all the bidders who
have already left the auction. Hence, Ωm equals {zn, zn−1, . . . , zm+1}, where Ωn is the empty set ∅.
According to Milgrom and Weber [2000], the symmetric equilibrium bidding rule in round m can
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be written as
βm(x) = E [V |X1 = Yk = · · · = Ym−1 = x,Ωm] (1)
where E denotes the expectation operator. Here, Yk, . . . , Ym−1 denote the kth through (m− 1)st order
statistics among the bidders who remain competing with bidder 1. On the other hand, the order
statistics in the event Ωm denote the order statistics for all the bidders who have exited the auction.
For completeness, we describe below the reasoning behind a characterization of the equilibrium;
in their paper, Milgrom and Weber [2000] presumably omitted an argument like this because they
found it obvious.
At price p, bidder 1 is concerned with the event that Yk, . . . , Ym−1 all drop-out simultaneously at
β−1m (p). Here, β−1m (p) is the inverse bid function. In this event, bidder 1 will be one of the winners
of the auction, together with his remaining (k − 1) competitors. Bidder 1 should remain active in
the auction at price level p if and only if
E
[
V
∣∣∣X1 = x, Yk = · · · = Ym−1 = β−1m (p),Ωm] > p.
In equilibrium, p = βm(x) or x = β−1m (p), so the price at which bidder 1 should exit must satisfy the
following:
p = E
[
V
∣∣∣X1 = x, Yk = · · · = Ym−1 = β−1m (p),Ωm] (2)
as long as the function in equation (1) is increasing in x. Hence, the functional form of the bid
function.
The winning price corresponds to the bid submitted by the bidder with the (k+1)st order statistic
of the signals during round (k + 1). Thus,
pˆ = E [V |Zk = Zk+1 = zk+1,Ωk+1] . (3)
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3 Limiting Information in the Transaction Price
In this section and the next, we have two goals: first, to derive the convergence rate of the trans-
action price pˆ to the true, but ex ante unknown, value v0; and, second, to characterize the limiting
distribution of the transaction price pˆ. In both of these endeavors, we assume that both k and n get
large, tends to infinity, in the Pesendorfer–Swinkels sense.
In this regard, we make the following assumption concerning k, the number of units for sale
relative to n, the number of bidders at the auction.
Assumption 1 τˆ ≡ [(n − k)/n] → τ, where τ is strictly between 0 and 1.
In words, the proportion of demand met has a stable limit as the number of bidders gets large.
Were this not the case, then as Pesendorfer and Swinkels [1997] have noted, the transaction price
will not have a stable limit.
With regard to our goals, we proceed in two steps. In the first, we define vˆ, the maximum-
likelihood estimator (MLE) of v0, based on the unobserved (to the researcher, but known to the
participants) order statistics zk+1, . . . , zn, and then we investigate the rate at which vˆ converges to v0.
In the second, we investigate the rate at which pˆ converges to vˆ. In the next section, we demonstrate
formally that the rate of convergence of the price pˆ to the true common value v0 will be driven
(dominated) by the convergence rate of vˆ to v0. In other words, (pˆ − v0) is op(vˆ − v0). Therefore, to
understand the rate of information aggregation, it suffices to focus on how vˆ approaches v0 as the
“sample size” n gets large.
Under our assumptions, the MLE vˆ is defined as
vˆ = argmax
v
log
[(
n
k
)
Ln(zk+1, . . . , zn|v)
]
where the joint likelihood function of all the signals revealed under the Milgrom–Weber auction is
proportional to
Ln(zk+1, . . . , zn|v) = [1 − FX|V(zk+1|v)]k fX|V(zk+1|v) fX|V(zk+2|v) · · · fX|V(zn|v). (4)
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Here, the term
[
1 − FX|V(zk+1|v)]k represents the fact that only limited information is known con-
cerning the signal values of the k winners, specifically, their signals are greater than zk+1. Also,
(
n
k
)
represents the fact that there are many ways in which the k highest order statistics of signals could
exceed zk+1. Equation (4) is the joint likelihood of the lowest (n − k) order statistics—those from
zk+1 to zn.
3.1 Convergence of Transaction Price to the True, but Ex Ante Unknown,
Value
Given equation (4), the sample average of the logarithm of the likelihood (log-likelihood) function
will be a function of the lowest (n− k) order statistics. A general function of order statistics can be
difficult to analyze because of the potentially complex correlation structure among order statistics.
When investigating the convergence properties of functions of order statistics, one possibility is
to appeal to the theory of L-statistics. Fortunately, this particular sample-averaged log-likelihood
function is more tractable than an L-statistic because it can be written as a function of the entire
sample as well as the sample τth quantile. Specifically,
ˆQn (v) = 1
n
logLn(zk+1, . . . , zn|v) (5)
=
k
n
log
(
1 − FX|V
[
ˆF−1n (τˆ) |v
])
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
log fX|V (zi|v) 1
[
Xi ≤ ˆF−1n (τˆ)
]
where ˆFn (·) and ˆF−1n (τ) denote the empirical distribution function and the quantile function; that
is,
ˆFn (x) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
1 (zi ≤ x) and ˆF−1n (τ) = inf{x : ˆFn (x) ≥ τ}.
With this definition, when τˆ equals [(n − k)/n], provided zk+2 < zk+1, ˆF−1n (τˆ) equals zk+1 with
probability one. Without loss of generality, in the remainder of the paper, we assume this holds.
Now, under the assumptions made formal below, and because the limit of τˆ is τ, by a uniform
law of large numbers, the sample percentile ˆF−1n (τˆ) converges in probability to the true population
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quantile F−1X|V(τ|v0), so ˆQn (v) converges uniformly in the parameter space of v to a deterministic
function Q(v0, v) where we define
Q(u, v) ≡ (1 − τ) log
(
1 − FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|u)|v
])
+
∫ F−1X|V (τ|u)
−∞
fX|V(x|u) log fX|V(x|v) dx
which implies
Q(v0, v) ≡ (1 − τ) log
(
1 − FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v0)|v
])
+
∫ F−1X|V (τ|v0)
−∞
fX|V(x|v0) log fX|V(x|v) dx.
As a short-hand notation, we define Q(u, v) by Qu(v) and Q(v0, v) by Q0(v).
In order for information to aggregate fully, Q0(v), as a function of v, must be uniquely max-
imized at v = v0. As in the case of full-sample likelihood function, this can be verified using
Jensen’s inequality. Thus, for any v not equal to v0, Q0(v) ≤ Q0(v0). One can demonstrate this by
taking the sum of the following two inequalities. First, by Jensen’s inequality,
∫ F−1X|V (τ|v0)
−∞ fX|V(x|v0) log fX|V(x|v) dx −
∫ F−1X|V (τ|v0)
−∞ fX|V(x|v0) log fX|V(x|v0) dx
≤ τ
[
log
∫ F−1X|V (τ|v0)
−∞ fX|V(x|v) dx − log τ
]
.
Second, it is easy to demonstrate that
(1 − τ) log
(
1 − FX|V
[
F−1X|V
(
τ|v0
)
|v
])
+ τ log FX|V
[
F−1X|V
(
τ|v0
)
|v
]
≤ (1 − τ) log (1 − τ) + τ log τ
because the left-hand side, considered as a function of FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v0)|v
]
, is maximized at τ.
Assumption 2 For v , v0, either F−1X|V (τ|v) , F−1X|V(τ|v0) or, with positive probability, X ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0)
under v0, fX|V (x|v) , fX|V(x|v0).
This assumption mirrors a standard full-sample identification condition for likelihood analysis.
While the monotone likelihood-ratio condition used by Milgrom and Weber [1982] is required to
derive the equilibrium bidding strategy, conditional on the form of the equilibrium bidding strategy,
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it is not strictly necessary for full-information aggregation to hold.
The first inequality will be strict under the first condition in Assumption 2 and, likewise, for
the second inequality, under the second condition in Assumption 2. Thus, we have demonstrated
that Q0(v) is globally and uniquely maximized at v0, provided the value v identifies the signal
distribution fX|V (x|v) in the sense of Assumption 2, which is stronger than the usual full-sample
identification condition whenever τ is less than one. The usual Jensen’s inequality argument for
full-sample likelihood function is just a special case of the above when τ is one.
Now, examine the following first-order condition at v0:
∂Q0(v)
∂v
∣∣∣∣∣∣
v=v0
= −
 (1 − τ)1 − FX|V[F−1X|V(τ|v0)|v]


∂FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v0)|v
]
∂v
∣∣∣∣∣∣
v=v0
+
∫ F−1X|V (τ|v0)
−∞
∂ fX|V(x|v0)
∂v
dx
= −

∂FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v0)|v
]
∂v
∣∣∣∣∣∣
v=v0
+
∫ F−1X|V (τ|v0)
−∞
∂ fX|V(x|v0)
∂v
dx
= 0.
Therefore, subject to the regularity conditions, which are outlined completely in the next section,
vˆ is a consistent estimator of v0. To wit, (vˆ − v0) p→ 0.
Given that Q0(v) is a properly-defined sample-averaged log-likelihood function that depends
linearly on the observed sample up to a given sample quantile and that the central sample quantiles
are
√
n-consistent as well as distributed asymptotically normal, the information equality then holds
for v, and is related to the asymptotic variance of vˆ. Given the form of Q0 (v), the expected Hessian
is ∂2
∂v2
Q0(v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
v=v0
where
∂2
∂v2
Q0(v) = − ∂
2
∂v2
FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v0)|v
]
− (6)
1
1 − τ
(
∂
∂v
FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v0)|v
])2
+
∫ τ
0
∂2
∂v2
log fX|V
[
F−1X|V(u|v0)|v
]
du.
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3.2 Information-Matrix Equality
In full-sample likelihood models, the asymptotic variance of the MLE is usually calculated us-
ing an information-matrix equality. Here, we demonstrate that an analogous information-matrix
equality also holds for the partial-sample information model that we consider, which we then use
to characterize the amount of limiting information contained in the price as an estimate of the true
value.
One approach to calculating the information-matrix equality is to view the limiting first-order
condition at v0 as an identity, and then totally differentiate it with respect to v0. Specifically, because
∂
∂v
Q(v0, v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
v=v0
= 0,
for all possible values of v0, the derivative of this relation with respect to v0 should also be zero.
∂
∂v0
[
∂
∂v
Q(v0, v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
v=v0
]
= 0.
This can be written as
∂2
∂v2
Q(v0, v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
v=v0
+
∂
∂v0
[
∂
∂v
Q(v0, v)
] ∣∣∣∣∣∣
v=v0
= 0. (7)
In the next section, we demonstrate that the second term on the left-hand side of equation (7),
which is the negative of the Hessian given in equation (6), equals the asymptotic variance of the
score function. The following provides a direct calculation of the second term in equation (7),
which independently verifies equation (7) and facilitates the comparison with the variance of the
score function in the next section.
To compute this term, we need to calculate
∂
∂v
F−1X|V (τ|v)
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as well as
∂
∂v
FX|V
[
F−1X|V (τ|v) |v0
] ∣∣∣∣∣∣
v=v0
=
∂
∂v
F−1X|V (τ|v) fX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v0)|v
]
.
Both can be found by totally differentiating the identity
∫ F−1X|V (τ|v)
−∞
fX|V(x|v) dx = τ
with respect to v, which leads to
∂
∂v
F−1X|V(τ|v) = −
∂
∂v
FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v0)|v
]
fX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v0)|v
] , ∂
∂v
FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v)|v0
]∣∣∣∣∣∣
v=v0
= − ∂
∂v
FX|V
[
F−1X|V
(
τ|v0
)
|v
]∣∣∣∣∣∣
v=v0
.
Using these relations,
∂
∂u
[
∂
∂v
Qu(v)
]∣∣∣∣∣∣
u=v=v0
= 11−τ
(
∂
∂v
FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v0)|v
])2
+
∫ F−1X|V (τ|v0)
−∞
[
∂
∂v
log fX|V(x|v)
]2 fX|V(x|v0) dx∣∣∣∣∣∣
v=v0
.
In the next section, we demonstrate formally that the log-likelihood function of the partially-
observed sample in our model has a similar statistical behavior to the usual full-sample log-
likelihood function, so
√
n(vˆ− v0) will converge in distribution to a normal random variable whose
asymptotic variance is the inverse of either ∂
∂u
[
∂
∂v
Qu(v)
] ∣∣∣∣∣∣
u=v=v0
or equivalently ∂2
∂v2
Q0(v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
v=v0
. We
now need to demonstrate that
√
n(pˆ− vˆ) is op(1) because, then, these will also represent the asymp-
totic variance of
√
n(pˆ − v0).
For this purpose, we employ Bayesian asymptotic analysis. First, note that
pˆ = βk+1 (zk+1) =
∫
v
fZ|V (Zk = Zk+1 = zk+1,Ωk+1|v) fV(v)∫ fZ|V(Zk = Zk+1 = zk+1,Ωk+1|u) fV(u) du dv
where the likelihood of the conditioning event in the bid function is proportional to
fZ|V(Zk = Zk+1 = zk+1,Ωk+1|v) = [1 − FX|V(zk+1|v)]k−1 fX|V(zk+1|v)2 fX|V(zk+2|v) · · · fX|V(zn|v). (8)
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Recall the definition in equation (4)
fZ|V(Zk = Zk+1 = zk+1,Ωk+1|v) = Ln(zk+1, . . . , zn|v) fX|V(zk+1|v)[1 − FX|V(zk+1|v)]
= exp[n ˆQn(v)]
fX|V(zk+1|v)
[1 − FX|V(zk+1|v)] ,
which we can write, using a change of variables,
√
n(pˆ − vˆ) =
∫
hpn (h) dh, (9)
where
pn (h) =
exp
(
n
[
ˆQn(vˆ + h/
√
n) − ˆQn(vˆ)
])
fV(vˆ + h/√n) fX|V (zk+1 |vˆ+h/
√
n)
[1−FX|V (zk+1|vˆ+h/
√
n)]∫
exp
(
n
[
ˆQn(vˆ + u/
√
n) − ˆQn(vˆ)
])
fV(vˆ + u/√n) fX|V (zk+1 |vˆ+u/
√
n)
[1−FX|V (zk+1 |vˆ+u/
√
n)] du
.
In the next section, we demonstrate that the above renormalized posterior distribution is asymp-
totically normal. Intuitively,
√
n(pˆ− vˆ) p→ 0 because the mean of the above renormalized posterior
distribution is asymptotically zero. Clearly, the single-unit model of the English auction investi-
gated by Milgrom and Weber [1982] is a special case of this result, when τ is one. This corresponds
to the conventional full-sample maximum-likelihood analysis and Bayesian posterior distribution.
At a typical English auction, where τ is one, the only difference from full-sample maximum-
likelihood analysis is that the maximum order statistic is unobserved. However, a single order
statistic is asymptotically negligible. Likewise, the conditioning event in the bid function in equa-
tion (8) differs from the corresponding partial-sample likelihood in equation (4) only by a single
order statistic and the difference is asymptotically negligible.
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3.3 Simple Example
Consider the following example, which can be solved in closed-form. Suppose that the conditional
distribution of X is exponential, having mean v, so
fX|V (x|v) = 1
v
exp (−x/v) for x ≥ 0, v > 0.
The posterior distribution needed to compute the bid function in equation (1) is proportional to
(
1
v
)n−m
exp
−1v
m+1∑
j=n
z j

(
1
v
)m−k+1
exp (−z/v)m−k+1 exp (−z/v)k−1 fV(v) =
(
1
v
)n−k+1
exp
−1v

m+1∑
j=n
z j + mz

 fV(v).
Suppose fV (v) is a diffuse prior. In this case, the above posterior distribution is then an inverse
gamma distribution having parameters (n − k + 1) and
(∑m+1
j=n z j + mz
)
, which has mean
E [V |X1 = Yk = · · · = Ym−1 = z,Ωm] =
∑m+1
j=n z j + mz
n − k ,
which is also the bid function at round m. Therefore, the transaction price is given by the bid
function with m equal (k + 1) and z equal zk+1:
pˆ =
∑k+2
j=n z j + (k + 1)zk+1
n − k .
To see why pˆ converges to the true v0, note that in this example, Zk+1
p→ F−1X|V (τ) which equals
−v0 log (1 − τ). Also, by invoking a law of large numbers,
∑k+2
j=n z j
n
p→ v0
[
log (1 − τ)
1 − τ + τ
]
.
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Therefore,
pˆ
p→ v0 1
τ
[(
log (1 − τ) (1 − τ) + τ)] − v0 log (1 − τ) 1 − τ
τ
= v0.
The maximum-likelihood estimator vˆ, which is the mode of the posterior distribution, is
vˆ =
∑k+2
j=n z j + (k + 1)zk+1
n − k + 2 .
Hence,
vˆ =
n − k
n − k + 2 pˆ.
It can then be verified that
√
n (pˆ − vˆ) p→ 0.
4 Asymptotic Distribution of Transaction Price
In this section, we provide formal conditions to justify the claims made in the previous section. Our
analysis is broken into two parts: in the first, we derive the asymptotic distribution of
√
n(vˆ − v0),
while in the second we demonstrate that
√
n(pˆ − vˆ) is op(1). As Newey and McFadden [1994] as
well as Chernozhukov and Hong [2003] have noted, both parts depend on the stochastic equicon-
tinuity properties of the sample-averaged log-likelihood function ˆQn(v).
To begin, we state assumptions sufficient to the task. Instead of striving for the weakest possible
set of assumptions, we are content with sufficient conditions that illustrate the main results. Note,
too, that in theoretical models of auctions the monotone likelihood-ratio condition is typically
imposed, which restricts how weak the conditions for equicontinuity can be.
Assumption 3 The true common value v0 is contained in the interior of the support of the prior
distribution which is continuously distributed at the point of v0.
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Assumption 4 The support of fX|V(x|v) is independent of v and bounded, while log fX|V(x|v) is
uniformly bounded, having bounded continuous third derivatives in both arguments on its support.
These two assumptions are regularity conditions required to demonstrate uniform convergence
and stochastic equicontinuity.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1 to 4, if fV(v) is continuous at v0 with a finite mean, then
√
n(vˆ − v0) d→ N
0,Σ (τ) = ∂∂u
[
∂
∂v
Qu(v)
] ∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1
u=v=v0
 ,
and
√
n(pˆ − vˆ) p→ 0,
so
√
n(pˆ − v0) d→ N [0,Σ(τ)] .
Remark 1: In the Pesendorfer–Swinkels model, under the same assumption (k/n) → (1 − τ),
only the signal of a single last-losing bidder is revealed, instead of the signals of all the losing
bidders. Therefore, intuitively, the transaction price in the Pesendorfer–Swinkels model should
aggregate less information than that in the Milgrom–Weber model. In fact, this turns out to be true.
While the transaction prices in both the Milgrom–Weber and the Pesendorfer–Swinkels models
converge to v0 at rate
√
n, the asymptotic variance of the Pesendorfer–Swinkels price is greater
than the Milgrom–Weber price. We demonstrate this result formally using the influence function
representation of the asymptotic variance. First, we note from the proof of the theorem that Σ (τ)
equals Var [ψ1 (X, τ)]−1, where the influence function ψ1 (X, τ) is given by
ψ1 (X, τ) ≡ ∂
∂v
log fX|V(X|v0) 1
[
X ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0)
]
−
E
(
∂
∂v
log fX|V(X|v0) 1
[
X ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0)
])
+
1
1 − τ
(
∂
∂v
FX|V
[
F−1X|V (τ|v) |v
]) (
1
[
X ≤ F−1X|V (τ|v) |v
]
− τ
)
.
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Next, we characterize the sample-averaged log-likelihood function as well as the score and influ-
ence functions in the Pesendorfer–Swinkels model, and demonstrate that they imply a variance
larger than Σ (τ).
The sample-averaged log-likelihood of the Pesendorfer–Swinkels model, which depends only
on a single order statistic zk+1 = ˆF−1n (τˆ), is given by
˜Qn (v) =k
n
log
[
1 − FX|V (zk+1|v)] +
(
1 − k
n
)
log FX|V (zk+1|v)
= (1 − τˆ) log
(
1 − FX|V
[
ˆF−1n (τˆ) |v
])
+ τˆ log FX|V
[
ˆF−1n (τˆ) |v
]
.
Its corresponding score function is
∂
∂v
˜Qn (v) = −
(
1−τˆ
1−FX|V [ ˆF−1n (τˆ)|v] −
τˆ
FX|V [ ˆF−1n (τˆ)|v]
)
∂
∂v
FX|V
[
ˆF−1n (τˆ) |v
]
.
If we evaluate the first-order approximation of the score function with respect to ˆF−1n (τˆ) as it ap-
proaches F−1X|V(τ|v0) at v0, and make use of the well-established asymptotic approximation of the
sample quantile
√
n
[
ˆF−1n (τ) − F−1X|V(τ|v0)
]
= − 1√
n
n∑
i=1
1
[
Xi ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0)
]
− τ
fX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v0)
] + op(1), (10)
then we find the following influence function representation for the Pesendorfer–Swinkels score
function:
√
n
∂
∂v
˜Qn(v0) = 1√
n
n∑
i=1
ψ2(Xi, τ) + op(1)
where
ψ2(X, τ) ≡ 1
τ (1 − τ)
∂
∂v
FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v)|v
] (
1
[
X ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0)
]
− τ
)
.
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Letting p˜ denote the transaction price in the Pesendorfer–Swinkels auction model, we have
√
n(p˜ − v0) d→ N
(
0,Var
[
ψ2(X, τ)]−1) . (11)
In order to demonstrate that Var [ψ2(X, τ)] ≤ Var [ψ1(X, τ)], we compute
ψ1(X, τ) − ψ2(X, τ) = ∂
∂v
log fX|V(X|v0) 1
[
X ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0)
]
−
E
(
∂
∂v
log fX|V(X|v0) 1
[
X ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0)
])
−
1
τ
(
∂
∂v
FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v0)
]) (
1
[
X ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0)
]
− τ
)
.
We can then verify easily that
Cov [ψ1(X, τ) − ψ2(X, τ), ψ2(X, τ)] = 0.
Hence,
Var
[
ψ2(X, τ)] ≤ Var [ψ1(X, τ)] .
Furthermore, this inequality can be strengthened to a strict one, Var [ψ2(X, τ)] < Var [ψ1(X, τ)]
provided Var [ψ1(X, τ) − ψ2(X, τ)] is strictly positive. This in turn holds when
Var
(
∂
∂v
log fX|V(X|v0) 1
[
X ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0)
])
> 0,
or when ∂
∂v
log fX|V(X|v0) is not a constant in the range of X ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0). Intuitively, when this
holds, the variation of the likelihood in this range provides more information in the Milgrom–
Weber auction that is not revealed in the Pesendorfer–Swinkels auction.
Remark 2: Above, we have indexed the asymptotic variance by τ, the proportion of losing bidders.
Intuitively, the larger the fraction of losing bidders, the more information revealed at the auction.
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Therefore, we expect Σ(τ) to be a monotonically decreasing function of τ, in a matrix sense. In
other words, for any 0 < τ1 ≤ τ2 < 1,
Σ(τ1) ≥ Σ(τ2).
In fact, this is true. That is, when τ1 is less than τ2, Var
[
ψ1(X, τ1)] ≤ Var [ψ1(X, τ2)], which follows
from
Cov [ψ1(X, τ1) − ψ1(X, τ2), ψ1(X, τ1)] = 0. (12)
Verifying equation (12) is tedious, but straightforward: it depends on the following two key rela-
tions. First,
E
(
∂
∂v
log fX|V(X|v0) 1
[
X ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0)
])
=
∂
∂v
FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v0)|v
]
and, second, that, for τ1 > τ2,
1
[
X ≤ F−1X|V(τ1|v)|v0
]
1
[
X ≤ F−1X|V(τ2|v)|v0
]
= 1
[
X ≤ F−1X|V(τ2|v)|v0
]
.
Generically, Var [ψ1(X, τ1)] is strictly less than Var [ψ1(X, τ2)]. This is true whenever
Var
[
ψ1(X, τ1) − ψ1(X, τ2)] > 0,
or whenever [ψ1(X, τ1) − ψ1(X, τ2)] does not equal a constant with probability one. A generic
sufficient condition is that
F−1X|V(τ1|v0) < X < F−1X|V(τ2|v0)
with strictly positive probability less than one, or that variation exists in ∂
∂v
log fX|V(X|v0) on the set
F−1X|V(τ1|v0) < X < F−1X|V(τ2|v0).
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Hence, under the assumptions made above, especially the common support Assumption 4, for
τ ∈ (0, 1), the larger is τ, the more information is aggregated in the Milgrom–Weber model, in the
sense of having a smaller variance despite that the rate of convergence stays the same. It can also
be demonstrated that this conclusion continues to hold without the support Assumption 4. When
the upper support is increasing in v, while the condition still holds, the rate of convergence can
improve beyond
√
n when τ equals one. On the other hand, if the lower support is also increasing
in v, then it is possible that the convergence rate is faster than
√
n even when τ is zero.
This desirable monotonicity property of information aggregation in the Milgrom–Weber model
is in contrast to the Pesendorfer–Swinkels model. The amount of information aggregated asymp-
totically in the transaction price of the Pesendorfer–Swinkels model is not monotonic in τ. For
example, when fX|V(x|v0) is uniform in X, the worst τ for information aggregation is one-half in the
Pesendorfer–Swinkels model because this involves the worst balance between the winner’s curse
and the loser’s curse. In general, the optimal τ in the Pesendorfer–Swinkels model depends on
the shape of this conditional density. Intuitively, in the Pesendorfer–Swinkels model, a different τ
selects a different information set, while in the Milgrom–Weber model, a larger τ always selects a
larger information set.
5 Deriving Likelihood Function of Observed Drop-Out Prices
In section 2, we derived the bid function of a representative bidder as well as characterized the
transaction price; see equations (1) and (3). In sections 3 and 4, we then demonstrated that the
transaction price converged in probability to the true, but ex ante unknown, value v0 and derived
the asymptotic distribution of that price. In this section, in order to provide a framework within
which to conduct our empirical analysis in section 6, we derive the likelihood function of the bid
data observed by an econometrician. We highlight the fact that the sampling variability of the
econometrician’s estimate of the true, but unknown, value v0 will depend on nuisance parameters
unknown to the econometrician.
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We first introduce some additional notation. Denote the jth drop-out price by pˆ j where j =
1, 2, . . . , n − k. For example, in our empirical application, we have n equal forty bidders and k
equal twenty units, so there are twenty drop-out prices, the last being the transaction price, which
we denoted above by pˆ, but now denote as pˆn−k. Thus, our observables are (pˆ1, pˆ2, . . . , pˆn−k−1, pˆn−k).
Now, from equation (2), we can recover the signal consistent with the first bidder’s drop-out price—
viz.,
z˜n = β
−1
n (pˆ1).
Likewise, for each of j = 2, 3, . . . , n− k, we can recursively recover z˜ j, the signals of the (n− k−1)
losing bidders, so
z˜n− j+1 = β−1n− j+1(pˆ j;Ωn− j+1).
For the k bidders who win the auction, all we know is that Z j exceeds β−1n−(n−k−1)(pˆn−k;Ωk+1).
In the general case, the bid function βm (x) in equation (1) takes the following form:
βm(x;Ωm) =
∫
v
fV(v)g (X1 = Yk = . . . = Ym−1 = x,Ωm|v)∫ fV(u)g (X1 = Yk = . . . = Ym−1 = x,Ωm|u) du dv
where
g (X1 = Yk = . . . = Ym−1 = x,Ωm|v) = [1 − FX|V (x|v)]k−1 fX|V (x|v)m−k+1
m+1∏
j=n
fX|V
(
z j|v
)
.
If we assume that fV(v) is diffuse and that, conditional on v, X is distributed normally, having mean
v and variance σ2, then we can write
g (X1 = Yk = . . . = Ym−1 = x,Ωm|v) =
[
1 − Φ
(
x − v
σ
)]k−1 1
σm−k+1
φ
(
x − v
σ
)m−k+1
1
σn−m
m+1∏
j=n
φ
(z j − v
σ
)
.
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To summarize, under the assumptions of normality as well as a diffuse prior,
βm(x;Ωm) =
∫
v
[
1 −Φ
(
x−v
σ
)]k−1
.φ
(
x−v
σ
)m−k+1 ∏m+1
j=n φ
(
z j−v
σ
)
∫ [
1 −Φ
(
x−u
σ
)]k−1
φ
(
x−u
σ
)m−k+1 ∏m+1
j=n φ
(
z j−u
σ
)
du
dv.
Consider (z˜n, z˜n−1, . . . , z˜k+1), the vector of (n − k) signals consistent with the observed drop-out
prices as well as the transaction price. The joint likelihood function of all the signals consistent
with the drop-out prices revealed under the Milgrom–Weber auction is
˜Ln(z˜k+1, . . . , z˜n|v, θ) = [1 − FX|V(z˜k+1|v, θ)]k fX|V(z˜k+1|v, θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂β−1
n−k(pˆn−k)
∂pˆn−k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
fX|V(z˜k+2|v, θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂β−1
n−k−1(pˆn−k−1)
∂pˆn−k−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ · · · fX|V(z˜n|v, θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂β−11 (pˆ1)
∂pˆ1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(13)
Here, θ denotes a vector of unknown parameters and captures the fact the probability density and
cumulative distribution functions of signals can depend on parameters known to the bidders, but
unknown to the econometrician.
The econometrician’s MLE v˜ is defined as
v˜ = argmax
v
log
[(
n
k
)
˜Ln(z˜k+1, . . . , z˜n|v, ˜θ)
]
where ˜θ denotes the MLE of θ0. Knowing the true nuisance parameters in θ0 is unimportant when
demonstrating that the transaction price converges in probability to the true value v0 because the
parameters contained in θ0 are of second-order importance. The nuisance parameters are, however,
critical when calculating an estimate of the sampling variation in v˜, the econometrician’s estimate
of the true value v0.
In this section, we have employed a parametric distribution (the normal) to model the condi-
tional distribution of signals. In general, without imposing shape restrictions, it is difficult to iden-
tify the distribution of signals, FX|V(·|v0) nonparametrically. First, even if the signals zn, zn−1, . . . , zk+1
were directly observed and n were large, the observed signals would only identify the lower por-
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tion of the signal distribution FX|V(x|v0) for x ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0). Second, the signals are not directly
observed and must be inferred indirectly from the observed price sequence. The observed distribu-
tion of the price sequence implicitly depends on the signal distribution FX|V(·|v0) nonlinearly, and
cannot be analytically inverted to recover the signal distribution. Third, the bid function, which
relates the signal to the observed price in equation (8), depends only on the lower portion of the
signal distribution up to F−1X|V(τ|v0). This implies that the observed price distribution does not con-
tain more information than the lower portion of the signal distribution up to F−1X|V(τ|v0). Parametric
functional forms incorporate shape restrictions, such as the symmetry assumption implied by the
normal distribution, that can be used to extrapolate information concerning the lower percentiles
of the signal distribution to its upper percentiles.
In our empirical analysis, we used data from a single auction at which the number of bidders
was large, forty. The theoretical model requires that, conditional on the true value of the object, the
signals of bidders be independently and identically distributed. The transaction price from a single
auction having a large number of bidders identifies the true common value for this auction. To
identify how that value relates to observed auction characteristics would require data from several
auctions; such data were unavailable to us. If data from several auctions with large numbers of
bidders are available, then observed auction characteristics could be incorporated into the analysis
by relating the prices from each auctions to the observed characteristics, either parametrically or
nonparametrically. Given the true value, the distribution of the signal can also be modeled to
depend on the observed auction characteristics to improve estimation efficiency. The relationship
between the valuation and the observed auction characteristics can then be consistently estimated
when both the number of auctions and the number of bidders get large. The convergence rate
and the inference distribution for the effect of the observed auction characteristics, however, will
depend on the relative size of the number of auctions and the number of bidders.
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6 Empirical Application
We have applied the methods described above to data from an auction of taxi license plates held in
Shenzhen, China in October 2007. At this auction, the municipal transportation bureau sold 2, 000
additional red taxi license plates. Red taxis are special in Shenzhen because they can operate both
inside and outside the Special Economic Zone (SEZ), unlike yellow taxis which can operate only
inside the SEZ, and green taxis which can only operate outside the SEZ.
By 2007, the city of Shenzhen had not issued any new license plates for red taxis since 1993.
Rapid growth in Shenzhen’s population meant that patrons were experiencing a shortage of taxis,
leading to an increase in the number of illegally-operated taxis. In 2007, the per capita number
of taxis in Shenzhen was low when compared to other parts of China: only 10, 305 taxis were
licensed in a city of 7.5 million permanent residents, about 13.74 taxis for every 10, 000 residents.
The Ministry of Construction in China recommended that cities should have 21 taxis for every
10, 000 residents.
Before the auction, the authorities reviewed the qualifications of all those who had applied to
participate at the auction. Potential bidders could be individual taxi companies or groups formed
by different companies. While fifty-one ‘firms’ apparently requested to participate, only forty
potential bidders were certified to participate at the auction. Thus, n was 40.
In written documentation, potential bidders were reminded to be aware of the risks involved.
For example, consider a translation of the text from one document:
Following this auction, more taxi license plates will be issued through auction or other
ways over the next four years. The number of taxis in Shenzhen will reach about
20, 000 by 2011. The issuance of a great number of license plates might have much
impact on the taxi industry.
Despite these warnings, representatives of taxi companies in the city showed great interest in the
auction, perhaps because operating a taxi has been one of the highest profit margins in the trans-
portation industry. Also, historically, taxis have provided a stable return against investment.
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Before the auction, 53 out of 73 taxi companies in Shenzhen owned between 50 to 200 taxis
each. In short, the majority of the city’s taxi companies were small- and medium-sized ones. Some
incumbent taxi drivers expressed concern that entry would erode profits. One was quoted in the
local newspaper (our translation) as saying that
Actually we are not earning much nowadays. If more taxis were on the road, we would
have a hard time making ends meet.
In contrast, local residents supported the issuance of additional license plates. One was quoted
(again our translation from the local newspaper) as saying
The sooner new taxis hit the road the better. It’s too hard to hail a taxi during peak
hours and holidays.
This anecdotal evidence, along with casual observation, suggests to us that the value of a red-
taxi license plate in Shenzhen has a large common-value component. Before the auction, however,
this common value was unknown to potential bidders. Using whatever means at their disposal,
potential bidders formed estimates of the unknown common value which they then used during
bidding at the auction.
The auction in Shenzhen proceeded according to the rules described in Milgrom and Weber
[2000]. In written rules announced before the auction, the authorities informed potential bidders
that the 2, 000 license plates on sale would be distributed evenly among the final twenty highest
bidders; each winner would be required to buy 100 license plates.
The auctioneer, Tian Tao, was a registered member of China’s auction industry association.
The reserve price was set at 150, 000 yuan per license plate, but the price rose to 500, 000 yuan
in fourth minute of bidding. During the auction, Tian reminded bidders repeatedly to be aware
of the risks involved. In fact, Tao took a break for ten minutes to allow the bidders “to cool their
enthusiasm.” We have translated one of his comments as “this is one of the most intensive auctions
I’ve experienced in my career as an auctioneer.” At the close of the auction, the price of a red-taxi
license plate was 542, 500 yuan, around US$80,000.
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In table 1, we present the prices called out during the auction along with the number of bidders
who exited the auction at those prices, while in figure 1 we depict the empirical survivor function
of prices. The units in this and other tables are in 10, 000 yuan.
Zhang Hongzhi, a manager of Shenzhen Xilie Taxi Company, was reported in the newspaper
to have said that he “felt very excited after we won a bid.” Before his attending the auction, his
company had decided on 550, 000 yuan as the highest they would pay for a red-taxi license plate.
To implement equation (4), we assumed that, conditional on v0, X is distributed normally,
having variance σ2, so
FX|V(x|v0) =
∫ x
−∞
1
σ
√
2π
exp
−
(
u − v0
)2
σ2
 du ≡ Φ

(
x − v0
)
σ

with
fX|V(x|v0) = 1
σ
√
2π
exp
−
(
x − v0
)2
σ2
 ≡
1
σ
φ

(
x − v0
)
σ
 .
We also assumed that fV(v) is a diffuse prior. In table 2, we present the maximum-likelihood
estimates of v0 and σ as well as their standard errors; the logarithm of the likelihood function for
this empirical specification is −55.98. Again, the units of the parameters estimates are in 10, 000
yuan.
Our theoretical analysis suggests that, despite the same rate of convergence, the asymptotic
variance of the transaction price is smaller in the Milgrom–Weber auction than in the Pesendorfer–
Swinkels auction. At the estimated parameters, for normally distributed signals, the probability
of a signal’s being less than zero is very small. Consequenlty, back-of-the-envelope estimates of
the asymptotic variances can be calculated using the estimated variance of the normal distribution.
For a standard normal Z, the asymptotic variance of the Milgrom–Weber transaction price given in
Theorem 1 and equation (7) is
(
1
1 − τ
1
σ2
φ
[
Φ−1 (τ)
]2
+
1
σ2
E
[
Z2 1 (Z ≥ 0)
])−1
,
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which, when τ is one half, is 2πσ2
π+2 . On the other hand, the asymptotic variance for the Pesendorfer–
Swinkels transaction price in equation (11) is given by
Var
(
1
τ (1 − τ)
1
σ
φ
[
Φ−1 (τ)
] (
1
[
Z ≤ Φ−1 (τ)
)
− τ
])−1
= τ (1 − τ)σ2φ
(
Φ−1 (τ)
)−2
.
When τ is one half, this equals 2πσ24 , which is twenty-nine percent larger than the Milgrom–Weber
variance. The extent to which this difference in the asymptotic variance translates into a differ-
ence in the expected seller revenues, however, depends on the variance of the prior value density
function.
In order to understand the implications of these parameter estimates better, we used them to
simulate the differences between transaction prices at a Milgrom–Weber auction and at a Pesendorfer–
Swinkels auction. Some of these results are reported in table 3. Each entry in the table records
the difference in the expected revenues between the Milgrom–Weber auction and the Pesendorfer–
Swinkels auction, again measured in units of 10, 000 yuan. In calculating table 3, we need three
parameters: the prior mean and variance of the common value distribution as well as the variance
of the signal distribution conditional on the common value. We used the estimate of v0 to specify
the prior mean, the estimate of σ to specify the variance of the signal distribution, and we varied
the prior variance of the value distribution as a proportion of the signal variance.
As predicted by the linkage principle of Milgrom and Weber [1982], the Milgrom–Weber auc-
tion always generates an higher expected revenue than the Pesendorfer–Swinkels auction. How-
ever, as table 3 illustrates, the difference in the expected revenues is relatively small when compared
to both the selling price and the estimated common value. Table 3 also reveals that the difference
in expected revenues at the estimated parameters is decreasing in the number of objects for a given
number of bidders: as the number of losing bidders decreases, relatively less information is being
revealed at an Milgrom–Weber auction relative to an Pesendorfer–Swinkels auction. As the prior
variance of the value distribution increases relative to the variance of the signal distribution (indi-
cating a larger variation of the common value component), the revenue difference also increases.
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7 Summary and Conclusions
Using a clock model of a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auction, within the common-value
paradigm, we have analyzed the behavior of the transaction price as the numbers of bidders and
units gets large. We have demonstrated that even though the transaction price is determined by
a (potentially small) fraction of losing drop-out bids, that price converges in probability to the
true, but ex ante unknown, value. Subsequently, we have also demonstrated that the asymptotic
distribution of the transaction price is Gaussian, and that the asymptotic variance of the transac-
tion price under the Milgrom–Weber pricing rule is less than that under the pricing rule used by
Pesendorfer and Swinkels for a sealed-bid auction format. Thus, if the transaction prices under
different auction formats and pricing rules are viewed as statistical estimators of the true, but ex
ante unknown, value of the units for sale, then the Milgrom–Weber auction is a more efficient
estimator of the unknown value than the Pesendorfer–Swinkels auction because more information
is released under the Milgrom–Weber auction than under the Pesendorfer–Swinkels auction. Note,
however, that when the number of bidders is large, the differences both in the expected transac-
tion prices and in their asymptotic variances are small because both transaction prices converge
to the same value. Finally, we applied our methods to data from an auction of taxi license plates
held in Shenzhen, China. We have found that the loss in the expected revenue by switching to the
sealed-bid auction from the ascending-bid auction is small, relative to both the transaction price
and the estimated common value. Our research suggests that the Pesendorfer–Swinkels auction
can generate nearly as much revenues for the seller as the Milgrom–Weber auction does, at least in
our particular application.
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Appendix
To reduce clutter in the text of the paper, in this appendix, we collect the proofs of the results
claimed in the text.
Proof of Main Theorem
The proof involves verifying two high-level conditions in Newey and McFadden [1994] as well
as Chernozhukov and Hong [2003]. The first condition delivers consistency, while the second
delivers asymptotic normality of vˆ and the relation that
√
n(pˆ − vˆ) is op(1). We first state these
conditions within the context of our notation.
Condition 1 For any δ > 0, there exists an ǫ > 0, such that
lim inf
n→∞
P∗
 sup|v−v0 |≥δ
[
ˆQn(v) − ˆQn(v0)
]
≤ −ǫ
 = 1.
Condition 2 There exists ∆n(v0) and J0 such that for v in an open neighbourhood of v0,
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i. n
[
ˆQn(v) − ˆQn(v0)
]
= (v − v0)∆n(v0) − 12(v − v0)2
[
nJ0
]
+ Rn(v),
ii. For any sequence δn → 0,
sup
|v−v0 |≤δn
|Rn(v)|
1 + n|v − v0|2 = op(1).
iii. ∆n(v0)/
√
n
d→ N
(
0,Ω0
)
, where both J0 and Ω0 are positive definite.
Under Conditions 1 and 2, it is shown in Theorem 1 in Chernozhukov and Hong [2003] that
for h and pn(h) defined in equation (9),
∫
|h|α
∣∣∣∣pn(h) − φ (h; 0, J0−1Ω0J0−1)
∣∣∣∣ p→ 0,
for any α > 0, where φ
(
h; 0, J0−1Ω0J0−1
)
denotes a normal density with mean 0 and variance
J0−1Ω0J0−1 . In other words, the convergence of pn(h) to a normal limiting density is in any poly-
nomial moments and is stronger than convergence in the total variation norm. Using equation (9),
this implies that
√
n(pˆ − vˆ) =
∫
hpn(h) dh
p→ 0. In the following we focus on verifying Conditions
1 and 2.
Condition 1 is, in turn, implied by uniform convergence of ˆQn(v) to Q0(v) and because Q0(v)
is uniquely maximized at v0. The unique maximum of Q0(v) at v0 is a direct consequence of
the identification Assumption 2. To show that supv∈V | ˆQn(v) − Q0(v)| is op(1), first note that the
individual terms in the summand of the second term consist of the product of log fX|V(Xi|v) and
1 (Xi ≤ ξ), where ξ represents a generic argument that will be evaluated at ˆξ = ˆF−1n (τˆ). Given
Assumption 4, the first is a type II function and the second is a type I function defined in Andrews
[1994]. Both satisfy Pollard’s entropy condition, and are stable under multiplication. Hence,
sup
v,ξ
∣∣∣∣∣1n
n∑
i=1
log fX|V(Xi|v) 1(Xi ≤ ξ) − E [log fX|V(Xi|v) 1(Xi ≤ ξ)]
∣∣∣∣∣ = op(1).
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Next, E
[
log fX|V(Xi|v) 1(Xi ≤ ξ)] is a Lipschitz function in ξ and the Lipschitz constant is uniform
in v. Hence, given that ˆF−1n (τˆ)
p→ F−1X|V(τ|v0), we also have
sup
v
∣∣∣∣∣E
(
log fX|V(Xi|v) 1
[
Xi ≤ ˆF−1n (τˆ)
])
− E
(
log fX|V(Xi|v) 1
[
Xi ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0)
]) ∣∣∣∣∣ = op(1).
Therefore, the second term of ˆQn(v) converges uniformly in v to the second term of Q0(v). The
first term of ˆQn(v) is also a Lipschitz function of ˆF−1n (τˆ) with the Lipschitz constant being uniform
in v. Therefore, by the same argument, the first term of ˆQn(v) also converges uniformly in v to the
first term of Q0(v). Hence, Condition 1 holds.
The second condition is more involved than the first. We define ˆξ to be ˆF−1n (τˆ) where ˆξ0 denotes
F−1X|V(τˆ|v0) and ξ0 denotes F−1X|V(τ|v0). We rewrite ˆQn(v) as ˆQn(v, ˆξ) to emphasize its direct depen-
dence on ˆξ. Note that, while ˆQn(v, ˆξ) is differentiable in v, it is not in ˆξ, so arguments relying on
stochastic continuity arguments are required. The ∆n(v0) and J0 elements in Condition 2 are given
by
∆n(v0) = n ∂
∂v
ˆQn(v0, ˆξ0) + n ∂
2
∂v∂ξ
Q0(v0, ξ0)( ˆξ − ˆξ0)
and
J0 = − ∂
2
∂v2
Q0(v0, ξ0),
respectively. We decompose Rn(v) into R1n(v) + R2n(v) with
R1n(v) = n
[
∂
∂v
ˆQn(v0, ˆξ) − ∂
∂v
ˆQn(v0, ˆξ0) − ∂
2
∂v∂ξ
Q0(v0, ξ0)( ˆξ − ˆξ0)
]
(v − v0)
and
R2n(v) =
1
2
n(v − v0)2
[
∂2
∂v2
ˆQn(v∗, ˆξ) − J0
]
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where v∗ is a mean value between v0 and v. Because ∂2
∂v2
ˆQn
(
v∗, ˆξ
)
− J0 p→ 0, it follows that
sup
|v−v0 |≤δn
|R2n(v)|
1 + n|v − v0|2 ≤
|R2n(v)|
n|v − v0|2 = op(1).
Consider, next, R1n(v), and define mˆ(v, ξ) = ∂∂v ˆQn(v, ξ). As in equation (5), define
Qn(v, ξ) ≡ (1 − τˆ) log [1 − FX|V(ξ|v)] + E [log fX|V(zi|v) 1(Xi ≤ ξ)]
and m(v, ξ) = ∂
∂v
Qn(v, ξ). Because the summand terms in mˆ(v, ξ) and m(v, ξ), ∂∂v log fX|V(zi|v) 1(Xi ≤
ξ), are the product of type I and type II functions defined in Andrews [1994], Theorems 2 and 3
in Andrews [1994] show that these terms satisfy Pollard’s entropy conditions and, therefore, the
stochastic equicontinuity conditions in equations (2.2) and (2.3) in Andrews [1994] hold with the
parameter now double indexed by v and ξ. It follows from this stochastic equicontinuity property
that
√
n
[
mˆ(v0, ˆξ) − mˆ(v0, ˆξ0) − m(v0, ˆξ) + m(v0, ˆξ0)
]
= op(1).
Note, too, by a second-order mean-value expansion of m(v0, ξ) in ξ, that
√
n
[
m(v0, ˆξ) − m(v0, ˆξ0) − ∂2
∂v∂ξ
Q0(v0, ξ0)( ˆξ − ˆξ0)
]
=
[
∂
∂v
m(v0, ξ0∗) − ∂∂vm(v0, ξ0)
] √
n( ˆξ − ˆξ0) = op (1) ×
√
n( ˆξ − ˆξ0) = op(1).
for a mean value (ξ0∗ − ξ0)
p→ 0, since √n(ˆξ − ˆξ0) = Op(1). Therefore, we can write
√
n
[
mˆ(v0, ˆξ) − mˆ(v0, ˆξ0) − ∂
2
∂v∂ξ
Q0(v0, ξ0)(ˆξ − ˆξ0)
]
= op(1).
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Consequently, R1n(v) =
√
n(v − v0) = op (1). Using the relation that x/
(
1 + x2
)
≤ 1/2, we conclude
that
sup
|v−v0 |≤δn
|R1n(v)|
1 + n|v − v0|2 ≤ op(1) and sup|v−v0 |≤δn
√
n|v − v0|
1 + n|v − v0|2 = op(1).
Having verified Conditions 2.i and 2.ii, it remains to verify Condition 2.iii. The Hessian term J0
is obviously positive definite because the limiting likelihood function is multiple-times smoothly
differentiable, and because v0 uniquely maximizes Q0(v, ξ0). We note, next, that ∆n(v0)/n takes the
form
− 1−τ1−FX|V [ ˆF−1n (τ)|v]
∂
∂v
FX|V
[
ˆF−1n (τ)|v
]
+ 1−τ
1−FX|V
[
F−1X|V (τ)|v
] ∂
∂v
FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ)|v
]
+
(
ˆE − E
) [
∂
∂v
log fX|V(Xi|v0) 1
[
Xi ≤ F−1n (τ)
]]
+ ˆE
(
∂
∂v
log fX|V(Xi|v0) 1
[
Xi ≤ ˆF−1n (τ)
])
−
E
(
∂
∂v
log fX|V(Xi|v0) 1
[
Xi ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0)
])
+ op
(
1√
n
)
where ˆE denotes the empirical mean. Because we have represented the influence function of ( ˆξ−ξ0)
as equation (10), we can compute that
∆n(v0) =
n∑
i=1
ψ(Xi) + op
(√
n
)
where
ψ(Xi) = ∂∂v log fX|V(Xi|v0) 1
[
Xi ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v)
]
− E
(
∂
∂v
log fX|V(Xi|v0) 1
[
Xi ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v)
])
−
1
1−τ
(
∂
∂v
FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ)|v
])
fX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ)|v
] [
ˆF−1n (τ) − F−1X|V(τ|v0)
]
= ∂
∂v
log fX|V(Xi|v) 1
[
Xi ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0)
]
− E
(
∂
∂v
log fX|V(Xi|v) 1
[
Xi ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0)
])
+
1
1−τ
(
∂
∂v
FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v0)|v
]
1
[
Xi ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v0)
]
− τ
)
.
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Direct calculation of the asymptotic variance in the last line, while accounting for the covariance
between the two terms, yields
Var
[
ψ(Xi)] = E
[
∂
∂v
log fX|V(Xi|v)
]2
1
[
Xi ≤ F−1X|V(τ|v)
]
+
1
1 − τ
(
∂
∂v
FX|V
[
F−1X|V(τ|v)|v
])2
.
By inspection, we see that its inverse coincides with the asymptotic variance given in Σ(τ),
which has been verified to equal J0 in the information matrix equality calculation and, hence, is
also positive definite. Its inverse yields the asymptotic variance of
√
n(pˆ − v0) and √n(vˆ − v0).
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Table 1: Announced Price, Number of Exits, and Total Exits
Price 20.00 22.00 23.00 24.00 25.00 26.00 27.00 28.00
Exits 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Exits 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Price 29.00 30.00 31.00 32.00 33.00 34.00 35.00 36.00
Exits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total Exits 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
Price 37.00 38.00 39.00 40.00 41.00 42.00 43.00 44.00
Exits 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1
Total Exits 3 3 3 3 4 4 6 7
Price 45.00 46.00 47.00 48.00 49.00 50.00 50.50 51.00
Exits 0 3 1 0 1 1 2 2
Total Exits 7 10 11 11 12 13 15 17
Price 51.20 51.40 51.50 51.60 51.70 51.80 51.90 52.00
Exits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Exits 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Price 52.10 52.20 52.30 52.40 52.50 52.55 52.60 52.65
Exits 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Total Exits 17 17 17 17 18 18 19 19
Price 52.70 52.75 52.80 52.85 52.90 52.95 53.00 53.05
Exits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Exits 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Price 53.10 53.15 53.20 53.25 53.30 53.35 53.40 53.45
Exits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Exits 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Price 53.50 53.55 53.60 53.65 53.70 53.75 53.80 53.85
Exits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Exits 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Price 53.90 53.95 54.00 54.05 54.10 54.15 54.20 54.25
Exits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total Exits 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20
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Table 2: Maximum-Likelihood Estimates of Normal Specification
Parameter Estimate Std.Error
v0 56.31 0.97
σ 19.35 3.95
40
Table 3: Simulated Differences in Expected Revenue
Variance Ratio∗=0.25 Variance Ratio=1.0
Number of Objects Number of Objects
Number of Bidders 10 20 30 10 20 30
20 0.120 0.221
30 0.127 0.056 0.238 0.103
40 0.108 0.070 0.042 0.208 0.136 0.079
Variance Ratio=4 Variance Ratio=9
Number of Objects Number of Objects
Number of Bidders 10 20 30 10 20 30
20 0.311 0.289
30 0.381 0.154 0.412 0.154
40 0.359 0.233 0.126 0.426 0.274 0.136
∗ Variance Ratio= Prior Variance/ Signal Variance.
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Figure 1: Estimated Survivor Function of Drop-Out Prices
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